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Volume XVI SPRING-SUMMER 1967 Number 2
THE TRIAL OF "STATE CASES"-A POST-
SCRIPT ON THE JACK RUBY TRIAL
ELMER GERTZ * AND WAYNE B. GIAMPIETROt
HE appeal from the conviction and death sentence of Jack
Ruby was part of that tragic chain of events which began more
than three years ago when President Kennedy was shot down
as he rode in an open automobile in Dallas. The ensuing events have
been such as to tax the ingenuity of the most imaginative writer of
fiction. The reversal of the conviction now appears to some persons to
have been inevitable. But such was not the feeling at the time. At least
one lawyer who briefly played a role in the defense thought only the
United States Supreme Court would reverse. No attempt will be made
here to indict any of those who participated in the case, although the
temptation is great. The pressure of events and the publicity which
attended every stage of the proceedings and the aftermath, to this very
moment, were such that no man, least of all Jack Ruby, could have
been given that fair and impartial hearing which is required by the
American Constitution.
The trial itself cannot be looked at in isolation-for it was only one
small portion of the fate which engulfed everyone both in and out
of Dallas. These things are all of one piece and cannot possibly be
separated. It is important that the atmosphere at the time of this trial
be fully understood in order to comprehend the ultimate result.
* MR. GERTZ is a member of the Illinois Bar, and received his J.D. from the University
of Chicago in 1928. He was one of the attorneys for lack Ruby who successfully argued
the appeal from the death sentence before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. MR.
GERTZ is the noted author of, "A HANDFUL OF CLIENTS," and several other works.
- MR. GIAMPIETRO is a member of the Illinois Bar, and received his B.A. from Purdue
University in 1963 and his J.D., with honors, from Northwestern University in 1966.
He is associated in the practice of law with MR. GERTZ.
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It is safe to say that no one series of events in the last century has
attracted so much instantaneous attention and publicity as did the
assassination of President Kennedy and the subsequent shooting of
Lee Harvey Oswald while he was in the custody of the police. The
communications media were out in full force to record the President's
visit to Dallas-would he be booed and degraded as had Adlai Steven-
son or Texas' own Lyndon B. Johnson?-and when he was gunned
down that great numbers of reporters and cameramen were immediate-
ly augmented by yet another contingent of those who were bound and
determined to inform America and the world, immediately and "in
depth," as to all that was happening. If there is to be any villain in
this piece, it must be desire on the part of the public to know. The
press, radio and television were aware of one and only one objective,
and, in pursuit of that objective, they descended upon Dallas with a
force which has seldom been felt anywhere and with which the
Dallas authorities were helpless to cope. The result was pandemonium
and disaster. It is easy to criticize in retrospect, and this has been done
by many. At least two books have been published already about the
Ruby trial,' at least one other partially written, to say nothing of
the countless newspaper and magazine articles and the voluminous
discussion which has gone on all over the country. The purpose of
this article is not to heap more abuse and blame upon those who were
caught up in this press of events, but to do what we can to understand
those errors which occurred and make suggestions to preclude their
reoccurrence. The appeal itself was concerned with the fate of one
inconsequential individual who was caught up in those momentous
forces and to grant to him that measure of justice which is due every
American accused of a crime, be it heinous or minor, notorious or
anonymous.
Immediately after the arrest of Lee Harvey Oswald, generally re-
garded as the President's assassin, the newsmen descended upon the
headquarters of the Dallas police like an irresistible swarm of locusts.
The Warren Report catches the atmosphere at the police headquarters
while Oswald was being held there:
In the words of an FBI agent who was present, the conditions at the police
station were "not too much unlike Grand Central Station at rush hour, maybe
1 BELLI, DALLAS JUSTICE (1964); KAPLAN & WALTZ, THE TRIAL OF JACK RUBY (1965).
2 BROWN, DALLAS, RUBY AND THE LAW (unpublished manuscript in office of Mr.
Gertz). This book was never published, due largely to the efforts of Jack Ruby's counsel
at the habeas corpus hearing.
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like the Yankee Stadium during the World Series Games . . ." Two large
television cameras were set up. Newsreel cameras, microphones, etc. were
also there. It was a "bedlam of confusion."
The corridor became so jammed that policemen and newsmen had to push
and shove if they wanted to get through, stepping over cables, wires, and tri-
pods. The crowd in the hallway was so dense that District Attorney Wade
found it a 'strain to get the door open' to get into the homicide office. Accord-
ing to [Special Agent Winson G.] Lawson [of the Secret Service], "You had
to literally fight your way through the people to get up and down the cor-
ridor. . . . Such police efforts as there were to control the newsmen were
unavailing ... ." Forrest V. Sorrels of the Secret Service had the impression
that the "press and the television people just ...took over."
On most occasions, Oswald's escort of three to six detectives and police-
men had to push their way through the newsmen who sought to surround
them. . . .Generally when Oswald appeared the newsmen turned their cam-
eras on him, thrust microphones at his face, and shouted questions at him.
3
Captain Fritz of the Dallas Police stated in his report:
[Oswald] was interviewed under the most adverse conditions in my office
which is 9 feet 6 inches by 14 feet, and has only one front door, which forced
us to move this prisoner through hundreds of people each time he was carried
from my office to the jail door, some 20 feet, during each of these transfers.
The crowd would attempt to jam around him, shouting questions and many
containing slurs. This office is also surrounded by large glass windows, and
there were many officers working next to these windows. 4
The Warren Commission itself stated:
In assessing the causes of the security failure, the Commission has not over-
looked the extraordinary circumstances which prevailed during the days
that the attention of the world was turned on Dallas. Confronted with a unique
situation, the Dallas police took special security measures to ensure Oswald's
safety. Unfortunately these did not include adequate control of the great
crowd of newsmen that inundated the police department building.5
The Warren Commission has concluded that these conditions con-
tributed to the death of Oswald:
(d) The Dallas Police Department's decision to transfer Oswald to the
county jail in full public view was unsound. The arrangements made by the
police department on Sunday morning, only a few hours before the attempted
transfer, were inadequate. Of critical importance was the fact that news media
representatives and others were not excluded from the basement even after
the police were notified of threats to Oswald's life. These deficiencies con-
tributed to the death of Lee Harvey Oswald.6
These pressures hardly abated even when the trial of Jack Ruby
had wound tortuously to its drastic end. The newspaper coverage
3 REPORT OF THE WARREN COMMISSION, 190, 191, 193 (N.Y. Times ed. 1964).
4 ld. at 552. 6 Id. at 40-4 1.5, Id. at 207.
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was overwhelming. At the hearing for a change of venue, R. S.
Walker, news director of station WFAA-TV in Dallas, testified that
something about the Ruby case was on that station and the others in
the area every day, and had been going on with particular thorough-
ness at least since December 20, the date of the first bond hearing for
Jack Ruby.7 He further testified that his station was carrying what
Ruby said in court each day.8
Immediately after Ruby was identified as the one who had killed
Oswald, the country was flooded with every possible bit of infor-
mation and misinformation newsmen could dig up about his back-
ground, his family and his personality. It is fair to say that absolute
accuracy was not the paramount consideration in the minds of news-
paper editors as they rushed to print every morsel of any kind con-
nected in any way with him.
Stories, often absurd ones, flooded the world: He was born in Chi-
cago's Maxwell Street ghetto of Russian immigrants, one of eight
children. His father was an alcoholic who abandoned his family while
Jack was still young. His mother shortly thereafter developed delu-
sions of paranoid schizophrenia and was committed to a mental insti-
tution. Jack left home at twelve and lived in foster homes for the next
two years.
Prejudicial and often untrue reports said he had lived on the border-
line between sharp practices and petty crime, making his living as a
ticket scalper and small-time gambler-"a youthful floater in the dis-
reputable environs of Chicago's Halsted Street." He was reported to
have peddled "fire sale" merchandise and illegal punch boards. He
helped an attorney organize the scrap-iron and junk-handler's union
and became an adept gate-crasher.
Because of his volatile temper he went to the West Coast after be-
ing forced out of the union, and there he sold newspaper subscriptions
door to door. He was drafted and served three years, advancing to
the not remarkable rank of Private First Class, and obtaining only a
Good Conduct Medal, his only known ability being to "wangle
three-day passes." He was honorably discharged and worked with
his brother Earl, selling salt and pepper shakers. He managed a twelve-
year-old Negro dancer known as "Little Daddy."
7 Transcript of Venue Hearing, 607. (Criminal District Court No. 3, Dallas County,
Texas, Jan. term, 1964).
8 Id. at 600-01.
THE TRIAL OF "STATE CASES"
He moved to Dallas where he had his name changed to Jack Leon
Ruby. His first business venture, a night club, failed. He acquired a
minor police record which included two convictions for carrying
concealed weapons. In 1959 he tried to export jeeps but was turned
down by the Cuban government. About this time he went to Cuba for
a vacation, his expenses being paid by a Las Vegas gambler friend. This
preyed upon him to the last day of his life. In the late '50's he opened
a rock-and-roll dance hall, known as the Vegas Club, and a striptease
parlor, the now immortal Carousel Club.
He was dubbed as a loud, pushy, name-dropper who cultivated
policemen, city officials and reporters. He was described as constantly
seeking "class." He worked out daily at the YMCA and served as his
own bouncer at the Carousel Club, where he employed his fists freely,
and, some acquaintances felt, more often than was strictly necessary.'
The picture of Jack Ruby which was presented to the world was far
from flattering.
At the ensuing trial, the demands of the press were so great that
Judge Joe B. Brown thought it desirable to hire someone to handle
the press accommodations. Judge Brown wrote, in the unpublished
manuscript of his book, Dallas, Ruby and the Law, that there were
568 members of the press in Dallas.10 There were so many that they
could not all be accommodated at the trial and a pooling arrangement
had to be devised. The Judge has also said that the streets outside the
courthouse "often resembled a circus.""u
Judge Brown has written about the effect of the press during the
trial:
It was this kind of relationship between press and police that led poor Jesse
Curry, our police chief, to make his great mistake. He was trying to be decent.
I was to understand it all too well by the time the Ruby trial was over. The
power of the press is subtle and insidious, but when it is directed against you
day after day, it can be almost overpowering. It causes you to lose your sense
of values and seriously to consider doing things that you would normally
instantly reject. Some of it is conscienceless. . . . I finally bent under this
pressure and agreed to allow a pool TV camera into the courtroom for
the reading of the Ruby verdict. The trial would be over. It seemed harmless
enough. I will eternally regret it. ...
I would like to say that we had very little trouble with the newspapermen.
Most of the commotion and noise that some of the [sic] complained about in
the courtroom, and there was very little, they caused themselves in their going
9 See KAPLAN & WALTZ, op. cit. supra note 1.
10 BROWN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 150.
11 BROWN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 6.
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and coming. I tried to remind myself that they had deadlines to meet. (Yet,
I don't know whether it was a wise idea to have them in the courtroom in
mass. I think they undoubtedly had an effect on the jury. I don't think any-
body on earth could tell you what the effect was, but the jurors were bound
from the sheer numbers of the press to have been impressed by the importance
of the trial).
At times, many of these newspapermen asked to see me in my chambers,
and I tried when I could to accommodate . . . I peddled no inside information
or worldshaking comments.12
This is a clear recognition of the fact that no matter what is actually
said in the newspapers before and during a trial, the notoriety of the
case itself is bound to affect those directly involved in it. All of the
extraneous matter which appears in the newspapers must have some
effect upon the jurors even though they make a conscientious attempt
to put it out of their minds. In Patterson v. Colorado,3 Mr. Justice
Holmes said: "The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be
reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in
open court, and not by any outside influences, whether of private talk
or public print.' 14
In Irvin v. Dowd,", it was said: "In essence, the right to jury trial
guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impar-
tial, 'indifferent' jurors."' 6 In as greatly publicized a case as this there
could not be many "indifferent" jurors. This was brought out force-
fully at the venue hearings had during this case, of which more will
be said later.
In Estes v. Texas, 7 the Supreme Court held that "The heightened
public clamor resulting from radio and television coverage [of a trial]
will inevitably result in prejudice.""' The Court specifically held there
that "this Court itself has found instances in which a showing of actual
prejudice is not a prerequisite to reversal. This is such a case."'"
From the very beginning, the press placed a great amount of pres-
sure upon anyone who was connected in any fashion with the case,
especially the authorities in charge of the investigation. Public officials
were not averse to giving out such information as they had, as well
as their opinions. This is what the Warren Commission has found:
12 BROWN, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 150, 159. Words in parentheses have been crossed
out in the manuscript.
13 205 U.S. 454 (1907). 16 Id. at 722.
14 Id. at 462. 17 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
If-, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). 18 Id. at 549. 10 Id. at 542.
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[T]he press was able to publicize virtually all of the information about the
case which had been gathered until that time. In the process, a great deal of
misinformation was disseminated to a worldwide audience ...
Most of the information was disclosed through informal oral statements
or answers to questions at impromptu and clamorous press conferences in the
third floor corridor. Written press releases were not employed. The am-
bulatory press conference became a familiar sight during these days. When-
ever Curry or other officials appeared in the hallway, newsmen surrounded
them, asking questions and requesting statements. Usually the officials com-
plied....
Wade himself also made several statements to the press. . . Wade told
the press on Saturday that lie would not reveal any evidence because it might
prejudice the selection of a jury. On other occasions, however, he mentioned
some items of evidence and expressed his opinions regarding Oswald's guilt.
He told the press on Friday night that Oswald's wife had told the police that
her husband had a rifle in the garage at the house in Irving and that it was
missing in the morning of the assassination. On one occasion he repeated the
error that the murder rifle had been a Mauser. Another time, he stated his
belief that Oswald had prepared for the assassination months in advance, in-
cluding what he would tell the police. He also said that Oswald had practiced
with the rifle to improve his marksmanship....
Concern about the effects of the unlimited disclosures was being voiced by
Saturday morning. According to District Attorney Wade, he received calls
from lawyers in Dallas and elsewhere expressing concern about providing an
attorney for Oswald and about the amount of information being given to
the press by the police and the district attorney. Curry continued to answer
questions on television and radio during the remainder of the day and Sunday
morning.
FBI director Hoover requested Curry "not to go on the air any more until
this case . . . [is] resolved. .. "
[T]he publicizing of unchecked information [by the police] provided much
of the basis for the myths and rumors that came into being soon after the
President's death. The erroneous disclosures became the basis for distorted
reconstructions and interpretations of the assassination. The necessity for the
Dallas authorities to correct themselves or to be corrected by other sources
gave rise not only to criticism of the police department's competence but
also to doubts regarding the veracity of the police....
The immediate disclosure of information by the police created a further
risk of injuring innocent citizens by unfavorable publicity.20
This flow of information did not stop with the silencing of Oswald.
District Attorney Henry Wade was quoted as saying that he would
ask for the death penalty with full confidence a Dallas County jury
would return the correct verdict in the case. 1 Another of the pros-
ecutors, the relentless Bill Alexander, was quoted as saying: "[T]he
shooting of a manacled man down in cold blood, and this is a death
penalty case." Sheriff Bill Decker said that "it is not inconceivable
21 Supra note 7, at 10.20o Supra note 3, at 214, 216, 217, 219.
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that the whole plot could have been hatched in Russia."22 Prosecutor
Wade emphasized:
Nobody deplored the assassination of President Kennedy and the murder
of officer J. D. Tippit more than I. They were cold-blooded crimes, but this
was also a cold-blooded murder and an assassination. I think this kind of pre-
meditated murder calls for the death penalty and I intend to ask it.23
Wade further stated that he intended to fill the gap on the trial
calendar caused by Oswald's death with the trial of Jack Ruby.24
The most important consideration, however, is the content of the
publicity which the case received. Immediately after Oswald's death,
the newspaper reporters began to seek a connection between Ruby
and Oswald.
The Dallas Morning News stated that a former roommate of Jack
Ruby had at one time been active in communist front groups. One
story said that the FBI and the Secret Service believed that Ruby and
Oswald had been neighbors, with one officer quoted as saying "this
could be the key we have been seeking." He also said: "Ruby said he
fired the shot because he wanted to avenge the murder of President
Kennedy, but investigators were never convinced this was his true
motive." 25
The prejudicial statements were not limited toward Jack Ruby
himself. They were directed as well toward his counsel. This publicity
was not confined to the local papers. An article on Melvin Belli, at
that time chief counsel for Ruby, appeared in the February 8, 1964,
issue of the Saturday Evening Post. This article detailed a banquet
Mr. Belli had given, stating that the dinner music was provided by a
naked harpist playing "Nearer My God To Thee." Immediately upon
Mr. Belli's arrival in Dallas, a newspaper printed a picture of Mr. Belli
in the company of another gentleman, stating that Belli was accom-
panied by a bodyguard. 26 There were many more of these stories:
(a) Reference that the State Bar's Code of Ethics was violated by
Ruby's attorneys by discussing the case with newsmen. One usually
reliable source said that both District Attorney Wade and Mr.
22 Supra note 7, at 133.
23 KAPLAN & WALTZ, Op. cit. supra note 1, at S.
24 Ibid.
25 KAPLAN & WALTZ, op. cit. supra note 1, at 13-14.
26 Supra note 7, at 732.
THE TRIAL OF "STATE CASES"
Howard had been notified by a letter Monday that the grievance
committee was looking into their actions.2 1
(b) Wayne Woodruff, Grievance Committee Chairman, denied
being the source of published reports which indicated that Mr.
Howard and Mr. Wade would be called on the carpet because of
statements made to the press. "It must be a figment of his (the re-
porter's) imagination to specify what the committee will discuss at
its regular monthly meeting tonight," fumed Mr. Woodruff.28
(c) "BAR WARNED ATTORNEYS ON CONDUCT."
"Grievance panel says no charge leveled at Wade." "Tom Howard,
Chief Defense Counsel for Ruby, and Jim Martin, another Ruby attor-
ney, left the hearing and declined to comment to newsmen. Both men
were grim." ". . .three hours behind closed doors. ' 29
(d) "Belli said he probably is more noted for the whopping judg-
ments he has won in' damage suits than for his practice in criminal
law." Then it refers to who else he represented including Errol Flynn,
Mae West and Perry Mason. "Mr. Belli and Paramount Studios cur-
rently is basing a film on his life under the working title of 'King
of Torts,' and Bobbs-Merrill Publishing Co. is bringing out his latest
book, Russian Life and Law."
"The attorney visited Russia two years ago. ' 30
(e) "Ruby's flamboyant attorney, Melvin Belli.' 1
(f) "Edward W. Kuhn of Memphis, Tennessee, a candidate for
President of the American Bar Association, accused Belli of accepting
the Ruby case, 'just for the publicity.' "32
(g) "The exotic Mr. Belli didn't get his man out of jail," Alexan-
der's comment.3
(h) "ATTORNEY HOWARD LAUDS D.A.'s HANDLING
OF RUBY HEARING WHILE TWITTING BELLI." "Attorney
Tom Howard Wednesday lauded the District Attorney's hand-
ling of Monday's Jack Ruby bond hearing while twitting Melvin
27 Dallas Times Herald, Dec. 4, 1963, A-12. Hereinafter, DTH refers to the Dallas
Times Herald.
28 DTH, Dec. 5,1963, A-28. 30 DTH, Dec. 11, 1963, A-39.
29 DTH, Dec. 6, 1963, A-25. 31 Ibid.
32 Dallas Morning News, Dec. 14, 1963, § 4, p. 1. Hereinafter, DMN refers to the Dal-
las Morning News.
33 DMN, Dec. 24, 1963, § 6, p. 1.
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Belli, who had supplanted him as Ruby's chief defense counsel."
"I think the big-city lawyer from out of state [Belli] found out
that Texas District Attorneys can hold their own in a court room."
Howard said, "and I think it came as quite a shock to him, too.""
The trial of Ruby is being called a $500,000 venture with some of the fan-
ciest attorneys, investigators and psychiatrists in the land being hired by the
Defense.
Another interesting facit of the Defense is the intriguing background of
Chief Defense Counsel Melvin Belli, the King of Torts from California. This
lawyer has exhibited an unusual interest in Russia and has only recently re-
turned from a trip there.85
We now come to the question as to whether Judge Brown erred
under Texas law in refusing to grant Jack Ruby a requested change
of venue.
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
A change of venue may be granted . . . on the written motion of the de-
fendant, supported by his own affidavit and the affidavit of at least two credible
persons, residents of the county where the prosecution is instituted, for either
of the following causes, the truth and sufficiency of which the court shall
determine:
1. That there exists in the county where the prosecution is commenced so
great a prejudice against him that he can not obtain a fair and impartial trial.
2. That there is a dangerous combination against him instigated by influential
persons, by reason of which he cannot expect a fair trial.3 6
An extended venue hearing was held in this case, the record run-
ning to 788 pages in addition to the vast documentation. The defense
put on the only live witnesses, while the prosecution contented itself
with placing into the record several affidavits to the effect that Ruby
could in fact obtain a fair trial in Dallas.
The source of the prejudice necessary for a change of venue is
immaterial3 7 The prejudice need not be against the accused person-
ally, but may be against his case."8 Here are just a few examples of
newspaper stories which appeared at the time tending to show that
the people in Dallas were prejudiced against Jack Ruby's case, if not
against him personally:
34 DMN, Dec. 26, 1963, S 4, p. 1. 35 Supra note 7, at 151.
:16 TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 31.03 (Vernon's 1966).
3 Grace v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 329, 234 S.W. 541 (1921); Randle v. State, 34 Tex.
Crim. 43, 28 S.W. 953 (1894).
S38Sorrell v. State, 74 Tex. Crin. 505, 169 S.'W. 299 (1914); Randle v, State, supra note
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"Let us Search Our Hearts .... Terrible history has been made in Dallas, and
the magnitude of our city sorrow can only be measured against the enormity
of the deed."39
"DALLASITES FLOOD CHURCHES IN SEARCH OF ANSWERS,"
"The ministers told the Times Herald that the sermons were equally applicable
to the latest death still another renunciation of the principles of orderly govern-
ment and God's laws."
40
PRESS RAPS DALLAS POLICE . . . "The misguided, degraded citizen
who fired the shot that killed Oswald . . .has placed a serious blotch on the
record of American justice," said the editorial in a special edition of the Las
Vegas, Nev., Review-Journal.
DALLAS HAS A CONSCIENCE .... Right now, there is urgent need for
the whole community to settle down to the business of normal living, to re-
lieve its tensions and to banish any dwellings of guilt.41
"The city has sired a terrible offspring and like Frankenstein, has lost con-
trol over the monster," "Dallas is a 'sick' city," Maley said, he is Secretary-
Treasurer of the Dallas AFL-CIO Council, "I speak for all of Dallas' organ-
ized labor when I say we are ready to work with anyone in an effort to lift
Dallas from the ashes of a great City to restore a little sanity to make Dallas
once again a great place where people can disagree agreeably. '42
Wade says: "Our whole judicial system will be on trial. This trial will de-
termine whether Dallas has a government based on the orderly process of law
or a government in which an individual can take the law into his own hands."'43
"I've lived here three months, but I'm going to look for a job some place
else. . . ." "I never thought we had those kind of nuts in Texas," said another
person. At Love Field, an angry grim faced person boarding a plane had said:
"They ought to take a regiment down there to Dallas and wipe those idiots
OUt."
44
"The radio said that Texans in the service over in Frankfurt, Germany, were
catching it on the account of what happened to the President. Every city has
some screwballs.. ...45
That this is a proper source from which prejudice sufficient to
warrant a change of venue may spring has been amply recognized
in Texas.40
The matter of paramount importance is not that it be proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt, or even by the preponderance of the evi-
39 DTH, Nov. 23,1963, p. 1.
40 DTH, Nov. 25, 1963, A-40. 43 DMN, Nov. 27, 1963, p. 1.
41 DMN, Nov. 25, 1963, § 4, p. 2. 44 DMN, Nov. 27, 1963, p. 9.
42 DMN, Nov. 24, 1963, § 1, p. 6. 45 DMN, Nov. 24, 1963, § 1, p. 6.
46 Handy v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. 3, 138 S.V.2d 541 (1940); Fulton v. State, 132 Tex.
Crim. 192, 103 S.W.2d 755 (1937); Fleming v. State, 62 Tex. Crini. 653, 139 S.W. 598
(1911); Gallaher v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. 296, 50 S.W. 388 (1899).
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dence, but that any chance that prejudice exists is the controlling
factor.
In authorizing the change of venue, the law proceeds on the assump-
tion that notwithstanding the fact that the required tests seek to de-
termine the impartiality of individual jurors on voir dire examination,
there may be such a prejudice in the community that improper jurors
may be obtained. A person may be prejudiced without being aware
of it, or he may purposely conceal his prejudice in order that he may
vent his malice on the accused.48
The Texas Constitution, Article 1, Section 10, guarantees an ac-
cused a speedy public trial by an impartial jury and this means that
the trial judge shall not put an accused to trial in a county unless the
circumstances and conditions of public sentiment are such that the
judge feels able to give an absolute assurance that neither by accident
nor design will any sentiment against the accused creep into the jury
box except such as is alone raised by the testimony introduced at the
trial.49
The enormity of the offense with which the defendant is charged
is material to the determination of whether the degree of prejudice
is such that a change of venue should be granted. ° The greater and
more horrible the crime charged, the more imperative the necessity
to safeguard the rights of the accused and the more closely should
the trial court scan evidence of prejudice.5'
The fact that the case has received general discussion and awakened
a wide interest tends to prove prejudgment of the case.52 It is also
permissible to have witnesses testify as to having heard the case dis-
cussed and to allow them to express their own opinion that as a result
47 Meyers v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. 500, 46 S.W. 817 (1898); Randle v. State, supra note
37.
48 Sorrell v. State, supra note 38; Coffman v. State, 62 Tex. Crim. 88, 136 S.W. 779
(1911); Faulkner v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 311, 65 S.W. 1093 (1901).
49 Sorrell v. State, supra note 38. See also Moon v. State, 169 Tex. Crim. 14, 331
S.V.2d 312 (1959); McCarley v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 263, 276, S.W.2d 300 (1955).
50 McNeal v. State, 105 Tex. Crim. 262, 288 S.W. 201 (1926); Parker v. State, 81 Tex.
Crim. 397, 196 S.W. 537 (1917); Faulkner v. State, supra note 48; Gallaher v. State, supra
note 46.
51 Streight v. State, 62 Tex. Crim. 453, 138 S.W. 742 (1911); Coffman v. State, supra
note 48; Steagald v. State, 22 Tex. Crim. 464, 3 S.W. 771 (1886).
52 Parker v. State, supra note 50; Gallaher v. State, supra note 46.
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of the prejudice existing in the county the defendant could not receive
a fair and impartial trial.5"
Testimony by a number of witnesses residing in the county, that,
in their opinion, the defendant could obtain an impartial trial is not
in and of itself ground for denying the application.54 The fact that
the witnesses for the defendant's theory of the case outnumber the
State's witnesses does not require a change of venue.'5 And testimony
of wimesses, that in their opinion a fair trial can be had, loses much of
its force where it appears that they themselves discussed the case
freely, and are familiar with the facts and have formed an opinion.56
As stated in Davis v. State,57 "The true test, however, is not the
possibility that twelve such men might be found but the probability,
through the methods provided by law, that such a jury would be
impaneled." 8
That this case was known to almost everyone in Dallas County
cannot be denied. Just about every witness in the venue hearing testi-
fied that he himself had discussed the case at length, not a few, but
many times. Even those who testified that they thought that Ruby
could get a fair trial admitted that the case was one of wide discussion
and that everyone was familiar with it.
Clayton Fowler, president of the Dallas County Criminal Bar Asso-
ciation, testified that most of the people he talked to were highly
opinionated, that it would be most difficult to find a fair jury in
Dallas.5 Costine A. Droby, a Dallas attorney, testified that he thought
the concensus to be that the only way Dallas could vindicate itself
was to convict Jack Ruby.6° Earle Cabell, a former Mayor of Dallas,
testified that there could be civic resentment against Ruby which
might make a difference with reference to his getting a fair trial. 1
Barefoot Sanders, United States Attorney for the Northern District
5 McNeal v. State, supra note 50; McNelley v. State, 104 Tex. Crim. 263, 283 S.W.
522 (1925); Tanner v. State, 96 Tex. Crim. 380, 262 S.W. 89 (1924); Stepp v. State, 92
Tex. Crim. 325, 244 S.W. 141 (1922).
54 Anschicks v. State, 45 Tex. 148 (1876).
55 Murray v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 389, 129 S.W.2d 678 (1939); Connell v. State, 45
Tex. Crim. 142, 75 S.W. 512 (1903).
56 Sorell v. State, supra note 38.
57 101 Tex. Crim. 352, 275 S.W. 1029 (1925).
58 Id. at 364, 272 S.W. at 1035. See also Carlile v. State, 96 Tex. Crim. 37, 255 S.W. 990
(1923).
59 Supra note 7, at 229-3 1. 60 Id. at 255. 61 Id. at 295.
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of Texas, said that he felt it would take more time and effort to get
a jury in Dallas than elsewhere.62 R. S. Walker, news director for
WFAA-TV in Dallas, declared that the people in Dallas had been
"saturated with information on our part."68 Stanley Kaufman, another
Dallas attorney, testified that there was a better chance of getting a
fair jury where there was less consciousness about the event and that
the further the trial was had from Dallas the better for Jack Ruby. 4
Robert O'Donnell, yet another Dallas attorney, said that almost every-
one he had spoken to about the case had an opinion on it.65 Mr. A. C.
Green, editorial page editor of the Dallas Times Herald, while of the
opinion that Ruby could get a fair trial in Dallas, stated that it would
be impossible to say that the case was not. on their minds, as it was
one of the most talked about subjects in the community. One of the
most respected members of the Dallas community, the merchant
Stanley Marcus, stated that he had great reservations as to whether a
fair trial could be had in Dallas."
Judge Brown, in his unpublished book, states that when Mr. Belli
first informed him that he was going to ask for a change of venue he
did not know whether or not Ruby could get a fair trial in Dallas.
6 7
Judge Brown writes that after spending three days on the change of
venue hearing "the results of Mr. Belli's cross-section of Dallas opinion,
were simply inconclusive. ' 6s He writes, when speaking of the earlier
bond hearing: "Nobody wanted Ruby to get out on bond, least of all
the defense. He probably couldn't have got six blocks from the court-
house alive .. ."9 How the judge could feel that Ruby could not
walk the streets of Dallas safely, but could get a fair trial there is
somewhat incomprehensible.
At the end of the venue hearing, Judge Brown accepted the prop-
osition of the prosecution that, as they put it, "The proof was in the
pudding" and that the only way to determine whether a fair jury
could be obtained was to try and pick one.
During the choosing of the jury, a member of the National Epilepsy
League appeared on the scene and passed out to the reporters in front
of the courthouse a "fact sheet" on epilepsy which informed those
who read it that Jack Ruby could not have been in an epileptic seizure
62 Id. at 558. 66 Id. at 218.
63 Id. at 594. 67 BROWN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 86.
64 Id. at 620. 68 BROWN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 144.
65 Id. at 640. 69 BROWN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 60.
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when he shot Oswald-the very defense upon which Mr. Belli rested
Ruby's case. A mistrial on this ground was immediately requested,
but the judge refused to grant one.
In all, 162 prospective jurors were examined. 121 were dismissed
for cause, 62 by the prosecution and 58 by the defense, one for illness.
The defense used all 18 of its peremptory challenges and the pros-
ecution used 11 of its 15. This alone should have convinced Judge
Brown that a change of venue was warranted.
Difficulty experienced in securing a jury should be considered on
an application for a change of venue.7° The fact that most of the
special veniremen from which the jury must be selected have been
disqualified by being summoned in other cases, 7' or that difficulty in
obtaining a jury was experienced at former trials, should also be con-
sidered.72 The fact that many prospective jurors expressed themselves
as having an opinion may, in connection with other circumstances,
show that a change should be granted. In Rhodes v. State,73 it was
held error to overrule defendant's applications when approximately
half of the special venire expressed themselves as having an opinion
and the prevailing opinion was that defendant was guilty. In Finks v.
State,7 4 the fact that ninety-five per cent of the jurors had prejudged
the case, along with other circumstances, required reversal. 75
If the evidence leads to the conclusion that bias, prejudice, or pre-
judgment of the defendant or his case is such as to render it improb-
able that a fair and impartial trial can be given him, the court may
not refuse the application.7 0
Certainly, the experience in choosing the jury must have made it
clear, after all of the testimony at the change of venue hearing, that
while it may not have been impossible to select a fair jury, it was
certainly improbable. The life of a human being ought not to have
depended upon such a gamble.
70 Carlile v. State, supra note 58; Mayhew v. State, 69 Tex. Crim. 187, 155 S.W. 191
(1913).
71 Faulkner v. State, supra note 48.
72 Mayhew v. State, supra note 70.
73 106 Tex. Crim. 663, 294 S.W. 212 (1927).
7484 Tex. Crim. 536, 209 S.W. 154 (1919).
75 See also Lambkin v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 11, 301 S.W.2d 922 (1957); Rogers v.
State, 155 Tex. Crim. 423, 236 S.W.2d 141 (1951).
76 Grace v. State, supra note 37; Randle v. State, supra note 37; Sorrell v. State, supra
note 38.
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Another indication that a change of venue should have been granted
is shown by Williams v. State,77 and Mickle v. State,7" where it was
held that a change of venue was warranted where it was necessary
that the defendant be protected by guards. This was the situation
here, where everyone that came into the court room was searched
and the police felt it was necessary that extensive security measure
be taken in the court room.79 One vital witness, as it turned out, had
a gun in her purse.
On appeal any doubt as to whether the trial was affected by preju-
dice and feeling should be resolved in favor of another trial.8 ° Another
indication of the existence of prejudice is the severity of the verdict.81
One very strong indication in this case that the jury was prejudiced
was the extremely short time which it took the jury to reach its ver-
dict in so important a case where the trial was very long and the
medical testimony extremely complicated. How could a jury have
come to agreement so quickly where several medical experts had tes-
tified, some of them disagreeing with others, if the jury had not had
some predilections in the case?
The most significant precedent, however, is the case of Sheppard
v. Maxwell,82 decided after the Ruby verdict. The parallel between
that case and this is striking. The main difference is that the publicity
in Sheppard was not nearly as pervasive. In that case the Supreme
Court has given us the clearest guidelines as to what can and must be
done by the trial judge to control the trial proceedings:
The carnival atmosphere at trial could easily have been avoided since the
courtroom and courthouse premises are subject to the control of the court.
As we stressed in Estes, the presence of the press at judicial proceedings must
be limited when it is apparent that the accused might otherwise be prejudiced
or disadvantaged. Bearing in mind the massive pretrial publicity, the judge
should have adopted stricter rules governing the use of the courtroom by
newsmen, as Sheppard's counsel requested. The number of reporters in the
courtroom itself could have been limited at the first sign that their presence
would disrupt the trial. They certainly should not have been placed inside the
bar. Furthermore, the judge should have more closely regulated the conduct of
77 145 Tex. Grim. 536, 170 S.W.2d 482 (1943).
7885 Tex. Crin. 560, 213 S.W. 665 (1919).
79 Supra note 7, at 778-79.
80 Mickle v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 560, 213 S.V. 665 (1919).
81 McNeal v. State, supra note 50; Cox v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 106, 234 S.V. 72 (1921);
Barnes v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. 297, 59 S.W. 882 (1900).
82384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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newsmen in the courtroom. For instance, the judge belatedly asked them not
to handle and photograph trial exhibits laying on the counsel table during
recesses.8s ...
Secondly, the court should have insulated the witnesses. All of the news-
papers and radio stations apparently interviewed prospective witnesses at will,
and in many instances disclosed their testimony. A typical example was the
publication of numerous statements by Susan Hayes, before her appearance
in court, regarding her love affair with Sheppard. Although the witnesses were
barred from the courtroom during the trial the full verbatim testimony was
available to them in the press. This completely nullified the judge's imposition
of the rule.8 4
Thirdly, the court should have made some effort to control the release of
leads, information, and gossip to the press by police officers, witnesses, and the
counsel for both sides. Much of the information thus disclosed was inaccurate,
leading to groundless rumors and confusion.s 5 ...
Defense counsel immediately brought to the court's attention the tremen-
dous amount of publicity in the Cleveland press that "misrepresented entirely
the testimony" in the case. Under such circumstances, the judge should have
at least warned the newspapers to check the accuracy of their accounts. And
it is obvious that the judge should have further sought to alleviate this prob-
lem by imposing control over the statements made to the news media by
counsel, witnesses, and especially the Coroner and police officers. The prose-
cution repeatedly made evidence available to the news media which was never
offered in the trial. Much of the "evidence" disseminated in this fashion was
clearly inadmissible. The exclusion of such evidence in court is rendered
meaningless when a news media makes it available to the public.86 ...
More specifically, the trial court might well have proscribed extra judicial
statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged
prejudicial matters, such as the refusal of Sheppard to submit to interrogation
or take any lie detector tests; any statement made by Sheppard to officials;
the identity of prospective witnesses or their probable testimony; any belief
in guilt or innocence; or like statements concerning the merits of the case.
See State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 389, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964), in which
the court interpreted Canon 20 of the American Bar Association's Canons of
Professional Ethics to prohibit such statements.
From the cases coming here we note that unfair and prejudicial news com-
ment on pending trials has become increasingly prevalent. Due process requires
that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences.
Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of effac-
ing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must
take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the
accused. And appellate tribunals have the duty to make an independent eval-
uation of the circumstances. Of course, there is nothing that proscribes the
press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom. But where there is
a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair
trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it
to another county not so permeated with publicity. In addition, sequestration
83 Id. at 358. 85 Id. at 359.
84 Id. at 359. 86 Id. at 360.
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of the jury was something the judge should have raised sua sponte with counsel.
If publicity during the proceedings threatens the fairness of the trial, a new
trial should be ordered. But we must remember that reversals are but pallia-
tives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice
at its inception. The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will
protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecu-
tors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement
officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frus-
trate its function. Collaboration between counsel and the press as to informa-
tion affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation,
but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.8 7
One of the main suggestions made in Sheppard is that the trial judge
should have postponed the trial date even if he determined that a
change of venue was not desirable. This surely is the least that should
have been done in the Ruby case. Much of the testimony at the venue
hearing was to the effect that the prejudicial publicity had saturated
the entire State of Texas and that it would serve no purpose to change
the venue, as any place in Texas would be similarly infected. If this
were actually the case, then the judge should surely have postponed
the trial date.
On December 2, 1963, even District Attorney Henry Wade was
quoted as saying that "I think it is highly unlikely that the inflamed
public feeling will permit such a trial until about mid-February. 8 8
His feeling was that by then the atmosphere would have become nor-
mal enough to permit a fair trial. There is nothing in the transcript of
the entire venue hearing which leads to the conclusion that things
had in reality returned to normal. In fact, there was evidence given
that the newspaper coverage had become even more prejudicial. On
about the second of February, 1964, a story appeared stating that tests
of Jack Ruby had shown that he had no brain damage. The reporter
who wrote the story admitted that when he got the story he went to
District Attorney Wade who refused to comment on it because he
did not want to do anything that would endanger the chances of get-
ting an impartial jury in Dallas, since this was something the Judge
had asked the attorneys not to submit to the newspapers. This was
clearly germane to the issues of the trial itself and was highly preju-
dicial to the defendant's case. Far from things going back to "normal,"
the public was inculcated with more and more information and mis-
information which would make it difficult, if not impossible, to reach
a verdict only upon evidence presented in court.
89 Supra note 7, at 121.87 ld. at 361.
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District Attorney Wade was later quoted as saying that "with the
tremendous amount of coverage, I think he can get as fair a trial here
as anywhere."8 This being the case, Judge Brown should have clearly
waited until the furor had died down. The defendant is not entitled
to "as fair a trial as anywhere" but a trial which is fair to him in all
respects. If the publicity was so bad, then the only possible thing to
do was to wait. Judge Brown, however, "was getting a little impatient
to get on with the trial."9 ° If the situation as far as publicity was
concerned was so bad, how could the defendant be expected to get
that "judicial serenity and calm to which he was entitled"? If any-
thing is clear, that is just what he did not get. Everyone in this country
is entitled to as exact justice as human fallibility can supply.
Did Jack Ruby get such a trial? Let Judge Brown speak for that:
"I do not think he received exact justice .... It still bothers me, but
I am not losing any sleep over Ruby."'"
It took the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals less than three pages
to reverse the conviction of Jack Ruby.92 There were two bases in
the main opinion of the court for this decision. The first ground was
that statements allegedly made by Ruby to Police Sergeant Patrick
Dean after his arrest were erroneously admitted as an oral confession
in violation of Texas statutes and not, as vigorously contended by
the prosecution, a part of the res gestae.93
An alternative ground for reversal was the failure of Judge Brown
to grant the defendant's motion for a change of venue. The court
stated that "it is abundantly clear from a careful study of both opinions
of the Supreme Court [Estes v. Texas and Sheppard v. Maxwell] and
the record of this case that the trial court reversibly erred in refusing
appellant's motion for a change of venue."
In passing, the court noted that Judge Brown had "recused" him-
self from any further connection with the case, "and, we have con-
cluded, properly so." This remark can only be a reference to the
contentions made by defense counsel, in a habeas corpus proceeding
89 Supra note 7, at 127.
90 BROWN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 163.
91 BROWN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 26.
92 Rubenstein v. State, 407 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
93 While this decision was based upon a Texas statute prohibiting the introduction
into evidence of an oral confession made while in police custody, the Escobedo and
Miranda decisions might also have barred the admission of such statements.
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brought in the Texas courts after the trial itself, but before the appeal
was decided, that the entire trial was void due to the fact that while
the proceedings were in progress Judge Brown was secretly engaged
in writing a book describing the trial, giving him a pecuniary interest
in the case. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied this petition,
stating:
This court is and has been since February 24, 1965, ready, able and willing
to hear, consider and decide the questions raised in said appeal in Cause No.
37,900, including the question of the claim of denial of due process and the
validity of the judgment of conviction.9 4
In his concurring opinion in the death sentence appeal, Judge Mc-
Donald devoted much more time to the change of venue motion. He
pointed out that the feeling had been generated that Dallas County's
deprivation of the opportunity to prosecute Oswald could find atone-
ment in the prosecution of Ruby. He stated that "the Dallas County
climate was one of such strong feeling that it was not humanly possible
to give Ruby a fair and impartial trial which is the hallmark of the
American due process of law."
Another interesting point which was extensively briefed by counsel
for both the prosecution and defense and mentioned in the very first
paragraph of the majority opinion was that "countless thousands wit-
nessed this shooting on television." Judge McDonald, in a specially
concurring opinion, stated that another ground upon which he would
reverse was the fact that ten of the actual jurors had witnessed the
shooting of Oswald on television. He was of the opinion that this was
enough to bring such persons within the provisions of the Texas
statute prohibiting a witness from serving as a juror.""
Judge Woodley, in his concurring opinion, on the other hand,
while not directly stating his views on this subject, pointed out that:
[T]he majority does not hold that a juror who saw the shooting of the
deceased on television is, for that reason alone, disqualified or subject to chal-
lenge for cause . .. as being "a witness in the case."96
While this is a fascinating aspect of the case, and one which is likely
to arise in the future, it is only another bizarre circumstance in a com-
pletely fantastic chain of events. Certainly, it is unseemly for one who
has in fact witnessed a crime and has, therefore, formed impressions,
o4 Ex parte Jack Ruby, 403 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
9.5 TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35. 16 (Vernon's 1966).
96 Rubenstein v. State, supra note 92, at 802.
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if not prejudices, to judge the guilt or innocence- of one accused of
having committed it. Television viewers saw more of Jack Ruby's act
than the police who were actually on hand and helpless to prevent it.
We will never know whether Jack Ruby would have been able
to obtain a fair trial anywhere within the State of Texas. His sudden
death from cancer cancelled his new trial arranged for Wichita Falls.
While the case was unique, the problem still remains. With the dra-
matic advances in technology, the news media are ever devising more
and more sophisticated and pervasive ways in which to cover news
events while they are in progress. One case in point is a recent occur-
rence, again in Texas, where a young man, lodged in a clock tower,
terrorized a university community by indiscriminately shooting at
anyone who happened to be passing by. The local television stations
were there almost immediately to record the proceedings for posterity.
The young man was slain by police officers before he could escape,
but one cannot help wondering what kind of a trial he could have
had when the entire community had been treated to a play-by-play
account of his crimes. To say that the man was clearly guilty means
little. Our society is irrevocably committed to a system whereby the
twelve good men and true who determine the guilt or innocence of
those accused of crime obtain the information upon which to make
such a determination from the trial and from nowhere else. Who
knows what evidence is adduced for the first time in the courtroom?
Another case in point is one proceeding in the State of Illinois at
the writing of this article where a young man is accused of murdering
eight Chicago nurses in their apartment. The newspaper coverage of
this crime was immediate and overwhelming, and was not confined
to the Chicago papers. A change of venue was ordered in that case, but
the voir dire proceeded at a painfully slow rate. The jury took only
fifty-four minutes to find him guilty on all eight indictments. What
then, is the answer to the two conflicting interests of the public to
be informed of "news" and the defendant to a fair trial?
Many have advocated a strict curb upon the news media. The
difficulty with such a solution, assuming that this is a desirable manner
in which to deal with the problem, is that any such curb must of
necessity be too little and too late. All suggestions in this direction
have placed the authority to impose restrictions upon a trial judge.
But by the time the case comes to trial, or even before the judicial
proceedings have begun, the damage has been done. Whatever else
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can be said about the news media, they are not lacking in ingenuity,
and they will have already informed their readers, listeners and
watchers of all the "facts" of the occurrence, the background of all
principals and their families, as well as information and misinformation
concerning anyone who happens to be within range of a microphone,
camera or reporter's eye or ear. Anything a judge might be able to
do at this point will serve at best to prevent an aggravation of the
situation. The damage will not be undone.
At the trial, even should the presiding judge keep a tight rein upon
the proceedings, the realization of the participants that they are in-
volved in a well publicized case may in itself be sufficient to militate
against a fair trial for the accused.
If the news media cannot be effectively prevented from saturating
the conscious and the subconscious of the general public in a sensa-
tional case, perhaps the way to approach the problem is to dry up
their prime sources of information. This would mean that police offi-
cials, prosecutors and defense counsels, also, might be prohibited from
making statements which could be in any way prejudicial to an
accused. This, too, would not be a cure-all. It cannot be repeated too
often that the news media are extremely inventive and resourceful and
there is nothing to prevent a reporter from obtaining background
material about a particular individual. This was the type of material
which was particularly prejudicial to Jack Ruby.
Until now it may seem that we are placing most, if not all, of the
blame for prejudice directly upon the news media. While many
believe that this is justified, it must be remembered that these people
are in a legitimate business of making money, and nothing sells news-
papers quite like a sensational story about a murder or a rape. Much
of the blame, if some blame must be assessed, must therefore be placed
upon the general public.
What then, is the answer to this conundrum? Clearly, restrictions
upon what the press may print are practically unworkable, often
ineffective, unwise and constitutionally wrong, for it is the constant
surveillance by the press, radio and television which assures us that
our public servants, including police and prosecutors, are performing
their duties faithfully and effectively. In the Ruby case it was deter-
mined that a change of venue should have been granted. While this
may be sufficient in some instances, in many others, such as the Ruby
case itself, this will certainly be insufficient, as the case will be almost
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as much discussed in -all parts of the state, or the country for that
matter. The next best remedy, as suggested by the Supreme Court in
Sheppard, is a postponement of the trial. While this may, in many
instances, allow the furor to abate and give the defendant a better
chance to be judged by a truly impartial jury, this certainly does not
comply with his constitutional right to a speedy trial. If the defendant,
as is so often the case, is unable to post a bond, either due to lack of
funds or because the offense itself is nonbailable, he must spend a
considerable amount of time in jail awaiting his trial. Should he be
found innocent of the charges, he has been effectively punished un-
justly.
While this conclusion is perhaps unsatisfactory, it appears that the
only workable solution is to rely upon the good sense of the news-
papers to restrain themselves in printing material regarding such
crimes. Then, once a judicial proceeding has in fact commenced, by
indictment for example, counsel for both sides, as well as police offi-
cials, must be compelled to save their evidence and information con-
cerning the crime for the actual trial and courtroom, and be pro-
hibited from trying their case in the newspapers. Such actions are
condemned by all canons of ethics of the legal profession. 7 The trial
judge must effectively control the decorum of the proceedings before
him as well as refusing to allow any outside influences to intrude upon
the proceedings.98
Other than these mild solutions, which seem to be the only work-
able ones, the appellate courts must always be on guard to reverse
those cases where there is any substantial possibility that unfairness
or prejudice to the accused has deprived him of that judicial serenity
and calm to which he is entitled. This includes the absolute necessity
that his case has been heard and decided by twelve jurors who have
not brought information with them into the courtroom concerning
the case and who have based their decision solely upon the evidence
presented to them at the trial. While such reliance upon the reviewing
courts to correct the wrongs perpetrated in trial courts may not be
wholly satisfactory, this is the system which has been adopted in this
country and is used to cure other errors occurring in trial courts;
97 See, e.g., Canon 20 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American and Illinois
State Bar Associations which states that newspaper publications by a lawyer as to
pending or anticipated litigation are to be condemned.
99 See, e.g., ABA, CANON 35, CANONS OF JUDICIAL Ermcs (1947).
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there is no reason why problems of adverse publicity should be treated
any differently than other errors at trial, such as perjury or the
erroneous admission of evidence.
The Ruby trial will long be studied for the light it casts upon the
implementation of the American Constitutional guarantees. We, as
participating lawyers, have never encountered a case more replete
with constitutional problems, some of them as yet unresolved. One
who enters such a case must be prepared for a process of self-inquiry,
no less difficult and rewarding than those directly associated with the
law and the evidence. What is one personally to do, or not to do, so
that the ends of justice will be served? There lies a story that requires
a different forum and another time for its proper development.
